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A Proposal for Modification of the Ontario
Appellate Practice
by Sidney B. Jacoby*
Professor Jacoby reviews the procedural differences between appellate
practice in the United States and Ontario. Generally, greater emphasis is
placed on written argumentation in the United States practice, and this, in
turn, allows for time limitations to be imposed on advocates when they present their oral arguments to the court. The author concludes that there are
certain advantages in the procedurefollowed in the United States, and offers
suggestions on how Ontario might modify its own practice to gain these same
benefits.

N ONTARIO THERE is no limitation by statute or rule of the time for
oral argument on appeals, and the practice of the United States of requiring appellate briefs, as such, is not followed. When an appeal is taken to the
Ontario Supreme Court, the appellant is required to file an "Appeal Book,"
the "Appellant's Statement," and the "exhibits and evidence," all "within
thirty days after setting down the appeal, or within fifteen days after the
evidence is ready, whichever is later." ' The "Appellant's Statement" is to consist of "a statement of the relevant facts," the "points intended to be argued"
and "a concise statement of the law relied upon in support of such points; in2
cluding the cases or authorities intended to be cited."
A comparison with the American practice shows the differences. Of
course, appellate practice in the United States varies in the different states,
but not importantly for our purposes. It may be desirable to set forth
primarily the federal appellate procedure.3 The Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure specify what the record on appeal is and how it is to be transmitted to the court of appeals. 4 Disregarding details, the original papers filed in
the district court and the transcript of its proceedings shall constitute the
record on appeal,5 and generally the record is to be transmitted by the clerk
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; John C. Hutchins Professor of

Law, Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University Law School. The substance of the article was
included in a series of lectures which the author gave in September 1977, as part of the CanadaUnited States Law Institute at the Western Ontario Law School, London.

I SUPREME
Cr.

COURT OF ONTARIO RULES OF PRACTICE 498(b)

[hereinafter cited as ONT. Sup.

R.]. Generally, the "Appeal Book" contains the formal papers (notice, pleadings,

etc.), the exhibits material to the hearing, evidence not transcribed, and other
material documents. Id.
2 Id. at
501-(1), I, II & III.

3 References will be made to the FEOERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
[hereinafter cited as FED. R. APp. P.]. For purposes of comparison, analogous rules will be considered under the OHIO RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE [hereinafter cited as OHIO R. App. P.].
4 FED.
6 FED.

R. App. P. 10, 11. See also, OHIO R. App. P. 9, 10.
R. App. P. 10(a). See also, OHIO R. App. P. 9(A).
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of the district court to the court of appeals within forty days after the filing

of the notice of appeal.6 We do not have the institutions of either an "Appeal
Book" or of an "Appellant's Statement." Rather, "statements" of an appellant

come much later. Upon transmitting the record, the appellant pays the
docket fee to the clerk of the court of appeals, 7 -and only within forty days
after the day of filing, when the briefing period begins, will the appellant
make "statements." s

The Rules specify in detail the makeup of the briefs. 9 For example,
10
there is a prescribed manner in which the record is to be referred to, as well
as a limitation on the length of briefs (not more than fifty pages except when

permitted by the court)," l but the most important subdivision may here be
quoted in full:

12

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order here indicated:
(1) A table of contents, with page references, and a table of cases
(alphabetically arranged), statutes and other authorities cited, with
cited.
references to the pages of the brief where they are
13
(2) A statement of the issues presented for reiew.
(3) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition
in the court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented fome review, with appropriate references to
the record (see subdivision (e)).
(4) An argument. The argument may be preceded by a summary.
The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.
(5) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
The appellee's brief shall be similar, except that he need not submit a
statement of the issues or of the case unless he is dissatisfied with appellant's
6
statement. 14 A reply brief may be filed in reply to appellee's brief.'
R. App. P. 10(A), 10(B).
7 FED. R. App. P. 12(a). If the appellant fails to cause a timely transmission of the record
or to pay a required docket fee, the appellee may move to dismiss the appeal. Id. at 12(c). See
alo, OHIO R. App. P. 11(C).
8 FED. R. App. P. 31 provides:
The appellant shall serve and file his brief within 40 days after the date on which
the record is filed. The appellee shall serve and file his brief within 30 days after service of the brief of the appellant. The appellant may serve and file a reply brief within
14 days after service of the brief of the appellee.
OHIO R. App. P. 18 sets forth a similar, but shorter briefing period.
6 FED. R. App. P. 11(a), 11(b). See also, OHIO

9 FED. R. App. P.

28, 30, 32. See also, OHIO R. APP. P.

16, 19.

'0 FED. R. App. P. 28(a).

1 Id. at 28(g). OHIO R. App. P. put no limitation on the length of a brief.
12 FED. R. App. P. 28(a).
"3 Rather than calling for a statement of the issues, OHIO R. App. P. 16(A)(4) requires the
appellant to set forth a statement of the assignments of errors presented for review.
14 FED. R. App. P. 28(b). See also, OHIO R. APP. P. 16(B).
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In the same way, the writing of briefs is emphasized in the United States
Supreme Court practice' s (which is mostly by certiorari).17 Rule 23 of the
Supreme Court Rules spells out in detail what is to be included in the written
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Among other things, it is to contain "the
questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances of
the case but without unnecessary detail,"1 8 and "a direct and concise argument amplifying the reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ."'' The
respondent has thirty days within which to file an opposing brief.20 The deci2
sion whether or not to grant certiorari is made without oral argument. ' If
certiorari is granted, 22 the parties submit their briefs which are in detail
described in the Rules. 23 Included in the brief is "a summary of argument,
suitably paragraphed, which should be a succinct, but accurate and clear,
24
condensation of the argument actually made in the body of the brief.
Thereafter oral argument, of one half hour on each side (unless otherwise
directed), is allowed. 25 The Rules explicitly state that "the court looks with
disfavor on the submission of cases on briefs, without oral argument, and
therefore may, notwithstanding such submission, require oral argument by
26
the parties."
Views have been expressed questioning the desirability of adopting for
the Ontario appellate practice some form of written briefs modelled after the
United States practice. In a recently published report by the Attorney
General of Ontario, opposition was voiced against the "substitution" of writ15 FED. R. App. P. 28(c). See also, OHIO R. App. P. 16(C).

16 For purposes of comparison, references will be made to both the United States Supreme
Court Rules [hereinafter cited as U.S. Sup. CT. R.] and the Ohio Supreme Court Rules
[hereinafter cited as OHIO SuP. Cr. R.].
17 For example, among the cases docketed in the Supreme Court of the United States for
the 1971-1972 term, 91.5% were brought on jurisdictional grounds of certiorari. REPORT OF THE
STUDY GROUP OF THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573, 620 (1972).
"8 U.S. Sup. CT. R. 23.1(c). See also, OHIO Sup. CT. R. II, § 4 A(l).
11 U.S. Sup. CT. R. 23.1(h). See also, OHIO Sup. CT. R. II, § 4 A(2).
11 U.S. Sup. CT. R. 24. See also, OHIO Sup. CT. R. II, § 6.

2 Upon expiration of the period for filing the reply brief, or upon an express waiver of the
right to file, or upon a timely filing of the brief, the petition and brief (if any) are distributed by
the clerk to the court for its consideration. U.S. Sup. CT. R. 24.3. In Ohio, discretionary appeals
may be taken to the Ohio Supreme Court only if leave is first obtained. OHIO CONST. art. IV, §
2. When leave is required, memoranda must be filed in support of the motion for leave, OHIO
Sup. CT. R. II, § 4, and the Court has the choice of either foregoing oral argument on the motion, id. at VII, § 1, or permitting fifteen minutes of oral argument for each side, id. at VII, §
3.
t,The percentage of cases in which certiorari is granted is quite low. For instance, for the
1971-1972 term, only 9.6% of all certiorari petitions filed were granted. REPORT OF THE STUDY
GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 17, at 615.
21 U.S. Sup. CT. R.

40.

24 Id. at 40.1(0.

2sU.S. Sup. CT. R. 44. See also, OHIO Sup. CT. R. VII, § 3, which allows the same time
for arguments on the merits for each side.
21U.S. Sup. CT. R. 45.1. OHIO SuP. CT. R. VII, § 2, expressly allows a party to waive oral
argument if proper notification is given to the Court.
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ten argument for unlimited oral argument, 27 principally on the ground that
the American appellate system is essentially a written one and that the "appearance of the 'Brandeis Brief is not uncommon." 28 This statement may be
misleading. True, the so-called "Brandeis Brief' exists in the United States,
and its function is to present to the court a wealth of legislative or economic
material usually taken from the practice of foreign jurisdictions or foreign
countries, i.e., material which could not properly be presented in oral argument. But the "Brandeis Brief' exists only in a minimal number of cases,
i.e., only where it is attempted to show by foreign examples that a certain
American statute does not violate "due process" or "equal protection," and is
therefore not constitutionally invalid. 29 The system of written briefs in the
American appellate practice, however, applies to every case.
Moreover, the problem may not have been properly stated in the Attorney General's Report. The issue is not, as the Report seems to suggest, a
choice between unlimited oral argument and a "substitution" therefor of written briefs. Rather, it is a matter of supporting the oral argument by written

briefs and, consequently, of making it possible and desirable to institute a
time limitation on the extent of oral argument. Generally, it seems desirable
from the viewpoint of judicial administration to institute some time limitation
but in the present Ontario practice such limitation may be unfair. However,
with the addition in Ontario of a limited briefing practice, such as will now
here be suggested, a time limitation seems fair.
Disregarding all minor discrepancies, the basic difference between the
two practices is the fact that in the United States the appellant submits a
written argument of his case only forty days after the transmission of the
record.30 The fact that the appellant's brief will contain other matters, such
as a statement of the issues presented, a statement of the case, and a conclusion,3 1 can here be disregarded because the Ontario practice of having an
early "Appellant's Statement" and a "Respondent's Statement"3 2 would seem
to satisfy the same purposes.
PROPOSAL FOR A MODIFICATION OF THE ONTARIO PRACTICE

In the United States practice, a written argument is to be submitted by
the appellant at a later stage than in Ontario. This longer period of prepara21 MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (ONT.CAN.), REPORT ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMITTEE ON THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ONTARIO

40 (1977).

28 Id. at 78.

" The term refers to the form of brief filed by Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908). The case concerned the constitutionality of an Oregon statute which restricted
the number of hours a woman could work to ten per day. Rather than offering a pure legal
argument, the brief presented a mass of economic and social data which demonstrated that the
issue was one that affected the health of women in the state, which in turn served as a constitutional basis for state regulation. The material included expert opinions, statistics, and an analysis
of similar domestic and foreign legislation which was aimed at limiting the working day for
women. Se S. KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 84-92 (1957).
30 FED. R. APP. P. 31. Under OHIO R. APP. P. 18(A), the appellant has 20 days to serve
and file his brief from the date on which the record is filed.
:I See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
2' ONT. SUP. Cr. R. 501.

ONTARIO APPELLATE PRACTICE
tion is desirable and merits adoption in Ontario. The following policy considerations and suggestions show how a modification of the Ontario practice
would assist both parties and the appellate court:
(a) The appellant, being required to put his appellate arguments in
writing at a later stageand not being forced to submit a "Statement" quite so
soon after notice, would have the chance of better analyzing, researching,
and formulating his own case for appeal purposes.
(b) The appellee, obtaining a copy of the appellant's argument, would
have the opportunity to better prepare his case in light of the appellant's
argument and, therefore, would be protected against the danger of unex33
pected arguments of the appellant.
(c) By means of his written reply brief, the appellant can formulate his
own thoughts, and will properly advise the appellee of his line of reasoning
with resepect to the appellee's written argument.
(d) The submission of written arguments by the appellant and the appellee in this form will assist the appellate court in handling appeals because
(1) the court will be better prepared for the oral argument; and (2) the court
is more likely to be spared unsatisfactory surprises. For purposes of administrative ease, a limitation could be placed on the maximum number of
34
pages contained in a brief.
(e) The contention that in preparation of the oral argument the judges
would have to spend considerable time in reading the written arguments of
counsel could be easily overcome in Ontario by making the submission of a
"Summary of Argument" not discretionary but mandatory.3 5 By reading only
the "Summary" the Ontario judges would be saving considerable time and
still would be adequately preparing themselves for the oral argument, which
under this procedure could be limited in time. In addition, proper utilization
of law clerks by the judges might result in cutting down the time required for
preparation.
In the Appendix there are set forth in Exhibits A and B excerpts of a
"Summary of Argument" and of an "Argument" in two different Supreme
Court cases. The two cases were selected because the excerpts show the value
an appellate judge can derive from summarization in different types of cases.
" While some surprises may still take place, their likelihood is much reduced if written
arguments were required. The oral argument could be limited by Rule to the points advanced in

the written arguments.
"' Maximum limitations on the number of pages of a brief are not uncommon in the
United States. For example, FFn. R. App. P. 28(g) provides: "Except by permission of the court
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages of standard typographic printing ... exclusive of...
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations,
etc." Reply briefs are similarly limited, but to 25 pages. Id. Similarly, one appellate district in
Ohio has instituted a 40 page maximum limit on both initial and answer briefs. LOCAL R. OHIO
EIGHTH APp. JuD. Disr. 6(7).
35 For instance, U.S. Sup. Cr. R. 40.1(f) states that only briefs in excess of 20 printed pages
require a summary of argument. The summary takes the form of "a succinct, but accurate and
clear, condensation of the argument actually made in the body of the brief." Under FED. R. App.
P. 28(a)(4), a party has the option of including a summary of argument in the brief.
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The first brief,3 6 set forth in Exhibit A, was concerned with the question
whether suspension of the mails for the distribution of obscene magazines was
constitutional. The reproduced excerpts of the "Summary" and of the "Argument" show how a "Summary" can properly be used by a judge where the
issue is strictly legal in nature. The second brief,37 set forth in Exhibit B, involved, among other issues, the question whether a broad discovery order of
the court requiring production of the documents of a bank over which the
plaintiff was alleged to have full control was proper. The reproduced excerpts
of the "Summary," as compared with at least a portion of the corresponding
part of the "Argument," show the values of a "Summary" in the instance
where a legal conclusion based on facts of record is being considered. The
important point for purposes of this discussion is that in both cases the "Summaries" were prepared at a later stage, after the briefs were completed, and
not, as in Ontario, at the early point when the "Appellant's Statement" and
the "Respondent's Statement" are filed. This longer period of gestation allows
for written argumentation which is better analyzed and researched by the
parties.
(f) In Exhibit C of the Appendix, there is set forth the full text of a
"Question Presented." The brief from which it is excerpted,3 8 was filed before
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. That court's
former rules required that the entire "Question Presented" text be placed at
the very first page of the brief, i.e., clearly set off from the commencement of
the brief.3 9 Arguably, a requirement such as this can assist the judge in
streamlining his thoughts regarding the case.
(g) Finally, adoption of written arguments and summaries should be accompanied by the requirement in a proper case to submit appendices,
preferably in the form of joint appendices.4 0 The value of an appendix is selfevident, especially in cases where examination of testimony is needed to support the persuasiveness of allegations made in a brief. In exhibit D of the Appendix, there is set forth a sentence from an appellate brief in a complicated
labor law case which the Secretary of Labor, plaintiff in the action, had lost
in the lower court. 4 ' Under a specific statute, the Secretary, upon complaint
s Brief for Appellants, at 11-12, 16-20, Blount v. Rizzi, United States v. Book Bin, 400

U.S. 410 (1971).
37 Brief for Respondents, at 23-24, 29-32, Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197

(1958).
" Brief for Appellees McGrath and Clark, at I, Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, 188
F.2d 1017 (App. D.C. 1951).
11 RULEs OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALs FOR THE DisTiar OF COLUMBIA 4(b)(2)
[abrogated July 31, 1973].
40 In federal appellate practice, the appellant prepares an appendix which includes "parts
of the record to which the parties wish to direct the particular attention of the court." FED. R.
App. P. 30(a). The Rules set out a procedure whereby the appellant and appellee may come to
an agreement as to all of the parts of the record which will be included in the appendix. Id. at
30(b). In any event, the appendix functions only to assist the parties and the court, since "the entire record is always available to the court for reference and examination." Id.
41 Brief for the Secretary of Labor, at 4, Wirtz v. Local 66, Glass Blowers Ass'n., No.
16944 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 1969) (remandedfor further proceedings).
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of a union member, had sued the union defendant to set aside an election
which it had conducted. The allegation was that the union had improperly
disqualified the individual from election to a union office, and the question
as to the frequency of the individual's attendance at union meetings, among
other issues, took on a crucial role. That portion of the record in the Appendix, to which the statement in the appellate brief refers, is also set forth in
42
Exhibit D.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it would seem that adoption in the Ontario practice of a
qualified briefing appellate procedure may be desirable. The preparation by
both parties of an argument, and a summary of argument, accompanied, if
necessary, by an appendix, would serve the purposes of (a) better preparing
the parties for the oral argument; (b) better acquainting the appellate judges
with the contents of the parties' positions; and (c) strongly reducing the
danger of unexpected surprises. In this manner, it would seem to be fair to
introduce a limitation on the length of oral argument on appeal. The submission of "statements" by the parties, not so soon after an appeal is noticed (as
it is now in Ontario), but in a more detailed form by way of argument after
the parties have studied and researched their positions, should facilitate these
desirable results.

42 Appendix to Brief for Appellant, at 138a-140a, Wirtz v. Local 66, Glass Bottle Blowers
Ass'n., No. 16944 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 1969) (remandedfor further proceedings).
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APPENDIX
EXHIBIT A
Brief for Appellants, at 11-12, 16-20, Blount v. Rizzi, United States v.
Book Bin, 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I
The postal power conferred on Congress by the Constitution gives
it full authority, short of restrictions imposed by the First Amendment, to deny the use of mails to commercial traffic in obscenity. See
United States v. Hiett, 415 F.2d 664 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 397
U.S. 936. Indeed, this Court has upheld against sweeping First
Amendment attack a statute parallel to that at issue here, regulating
the use of the mails for transmission of fraudulent and lottery matter.
39 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 4005; Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S.
178. It found not "the slightest support for a contention that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of press include complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to use the mails
for perpetration of swindling schemes." 333 U.S. at 191. Similarly,
the First Amendment does not confer complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to use the mails for commerce in pornography.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, requires no different conclusion. Stanley does not protect commercial activity, even where it occurs in relative privacy, among adults, and without causing alarm to
the community as a whole by involving unwilling persons. That opinion protects privacy, and in particular the privacy of ideas; it does
not follow that an individual has any "right to recqive" obscene
materials, which by this Court's definition embody no redeeming advocacy of ideas. A commercial pornographer is not more entitled by
Stanley to receive his mail unimpeded than he would be to protect
himself from otherwise lawful searches and seizures of his place of
business by using his home for that purpose.

ARGUMENT
I. CONGRESS HAS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY, BY AN
APPROPRIATELY LIMITED STATUTE, TO DENY THE USE OF
THE MAILS TO COMMERCIAL TRAFFICKERS IN PORNOGRAPHY FOR THE RECEIPT OF PAYMENTS AND ORDERS
FOR OBSCENE MATERIALS
Congress' constitutional power to "Establish Post Offices and post
roads" and to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States," Art. I, Section 8, includes full power to deny the

1979]

ONTARIO APPELLATE PRACTICE

use of the mails to commercial traffic in obscenity. Short of restrictions imposed by the First Amendment, its right to prohibit the carriage of unlawful or dangerous items, or the carrying on of an
unlawful business through the mails is not open to doubt. United
States v. Hiett, 415 F.2d 664, 666-669 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied,
397 U.S. 936. Some items are prohibited because of their inherent
dangerousness, including danger to the carriage of the mails
themselves, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1716; others, because of the unlawfulness
of the transmission, and a desire to protect the postal service from involvement, however innocent, in such sendings. 18 U.S.C. 1302,
1341, 1717, 1718; 39 U.S.C. 4001. The Post Office Department is
not only a common carrier, but also an instrumentality of government. As such, it is peculiarly affected with a public interest; within
the limits imposed by the Bill of Rights, and especially the First
Amendment, it is important and proper to protect that interest from
involvement, even unknowing, with crime.
These propositions were reaffirmed in a case involving a statute
parallel to the obscenity statute at issue here, but in that case
regulating the use of the mails for transmission of fraudulent and lottery matter. Federal criminal statutes make it an offense to use the
mails in connection with a lottery or a fraudulent scheme. 18 U.S.C.
1302, 1341. When the Postmaster General is persuaded that a person
is using the mails for such a scheme, however; he may also invoke the
civil remedy of 39 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 4005, permitting the return to
their senders of letters addressed to that person or his representative,
with the letters appropriately stamped to indicate the reason for their
return. In 1945, he invoked that remedy against Facts Magazine and
others on account of an allegedly fraudulent "puzzle contest" appearing in that magazine, and this Court upheld him. Donaldson v. Read
Magazine, 333 U.S. 178.
Although the publishers of Facts Magazine mounted a broadscale
constitutional attack on Section 4005 and its application to
them-including, inter alia, First Amendment claims, 333 U.S. at
189, 191-the Court found the government's power to protect its
citizens against use of the mails to perpetrate fraud to be firmly
established, and sufficient to support the statute. The Court appears
to have accepted the publishers' contention, as we do here, that Congress' power of regulation over postal matters, as over commerce and
tax, is limited by the strictures of the Bill of Rights; but those limitations do not "provide the slightest support for a contention that the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press include complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to use
the mails for perpetration of swindling schemes." 333 U.S. at 191;
and see Hiett, supra, 415 F.2d at 667.
Similarly, we believe the First Amendment does not confer on individuals complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to use the
mails for commerce in pornography. As in the case of fraud, such
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use may be prohibited by criminal statute. Compare 18 U.S.C. 1341
with 18 U.S.C. 1461; Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 with Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476. And assuming-as in the case of
fraud-that requisite constitutional limitations are honored, the use
may also be regulated by civil means. Since civil interdiction of mail
to a person engaged in fraud meets the constitutional tests, it would
appear that civil interdiction of mail to a commercial salesman of
obscenity would do so as well. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 441.
It may be argued, however, that this Court's recent decision in
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, requires an opposite conclusion.
Although the opinion in that case limited itself in terms to a holding
that the state has no power to make criminal the mere possession of
obscene literature in a private home, and expressly disavowed any intent to limit the Roth doctrine, 394 U.S. at 565, 568, some lower
courts have read it as protecting commercial activity, particularly
where that activity occurs in relative privacy, among adults, and
without causing alarm to the community as a whole by involving unwilling persons. See, e.g., Byrne v. Karalexis, set for reargument,
No. 83, this Term; United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, pending on jurisdictional statement, No. 133, this Term. If Stanley does
protect such activity, then it might appear that use of the
mails-inherently private and, in the case of a mailed order blank,
ordinarily consensual [footnote omitted] - is indeed protected from
government regulation. On that reasoning, only the uninvited advertisement or mailing of obscene matter to a minor could be made an
offense, and Roth would have been not only limited but overruled.
We believe Stanley has no such reach. As we explain at greater
length in our brief Amicus Curiae in Byrne v. Karalexis, supra, pp.
6-17, Stanley's disclaimer of any purpose to modify Roth in its application to the commercial distribution of pornography can and
should be honored. Stanley recognized that, for important and compelling reasons, the state has no right to intrude into a private home
in search of obscenity. That the owner of those places has a constitutional right against intrusion into them does not mean, however, that
he has a First Amendment right, as such, to have everything which
might otherwise be found there. The First Amendment protects
materials otherwise be found there. The First Amendment protects
materials otherwise obscene in such circumstances because of the risks
to privacy, to protected speech and thought, which would be
presented by a governmental search. It does not follow that an individual has a "right to receive" obscene materials. It therefore cannot be argued, we submit, that there is any First Amendment right
to disseminate such materials.
Nor do we think the use of the mails in this kind of case can
fairly be analogized to the use of a home or office as a private sanctuary from state inquiry. It is true that, like the home, first ciass mail
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is protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. 39 U.S.C.
4057; cf. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249. Accordingly,
it is possible that consensual, non-commercial correspondence sent
through the mails would be found to enjoy immunity under Stanley
from seizure or use as the basis for prosecution; as this Court knows,
the government's policy is not to prosecute such cases. Redmond v.
United States, 384 U.S. 264; and see the Memorandum for the
United States therein, No. 1056, O.T. 1965, pp. 3-4. But here, the
mails are being used for a commercial purpose, and that degree of
concern for the privacy of ideas is no longer appropriate. Just as a
home used as a place of business by a dealer in pornography would
not be immune from search under Stanley, use of the mails for commercial purposes in connection with dealings in obscenity is subject to
regulation without any offense to the Stanley holding.

11
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EXHIBIT B
Brief for Respondents, at 23-24, 29-32, Societe Internationale v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197 (1958).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The order for discovery was eminently proper. While the
documents ordered produced were those of Sturzenegger & Cie. [a
private bank], nominally an entity other than petitioner, petitioner
had full control of the records. The lower courts' conclusion as to
control was grounded on an abundance of evidence showing the common origin of the two companies in I.G. Farben; their common service for I.G. Farben; their common management, personnel, and activities; the administration by one of the assets of the other; and their
cross-ties of ownership ....
ARGUMENT

I
THE ORDERS BELOW WERE BASED ON EVIDENCE SHOWING
A VIRTUAL IDENTITY BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
STURZENEGGER & CIE., THE FIRM WHOSE RECORDS IT
WAS ORDERED TO PRODUCE
The district court initially made prima facie findings that petitioner had control of the Sturzenegger records in 1949 . . . . In
February 1953, after four years of proceedings, Chief Judge Laws extensively reexamined the matter and reaffirmed his conclusion ....
The district court's detailed findings and the conclusion of control were explicitly approved by the court of appeals in its opinion of
June 30, 1955 . ...
In the findings on control, the district court found an intimacy
verging on identity between petitioner and the Sturzenegger firm,
whose records petitioner was ordered to produce. This virtual identity,
of course, supports the order of discovery . ...
The findings of control and identity are supported by a wealth of
evidence on the ties between petitioner and the Sturzenegger
firm-evidence showing the creation of petitioner by the Sturzenegger
firm, their joint personnel and activity, their physical proximity, the
performance by the one of the other's functions, and the existence of
cross-ownership. Separate findings on each of these factors were
made by the district court (R. 611-3) [footnote omitted].
Petitioner was created in 1928 by Gruetert & Cie. (the name of
the Sturzenegger firm until 1939) on behalf of I.G. Farben. The
court so found (R. 611-3), and its finding is supported by the report
of the Swiss Compensation Office that Greutert & Cie. founded peti-
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tioner pursuant to the plan of Hermann Schmitz of Farben (R.
211-3, 248). Counsel for petitioner, who describes Schmitz, chairman
of Farben's board, as "the most prominent individual at the head of
I.G. Farben", concedes that petitioner was "sired very greatly by the
Hermann Schmitz influence" (R. 63-5). He says further that "[t]here
was no secret about the fact that the Germans of Farben had sponsored both" petitioner and the American I.G. Chemical Co., the
predecessor of the General Aniline & Film Corporation, whose stock
petitioner now claims (R. 89).
The Gruetert firm was itself a creature of Farben. It was owned,
from 1931, by Visca A. G., a company whose stockholders, Mr. Hans
Sturzenegger said, were "people closely connected with I.G. Farben"
(R. 63-5, 88-9, 216, 268-71, 1717, 1279-85, 1847-63, 1882-94,
1712-22). According to Alfred Merton and Rudolf Euler, for a time
co-owners with Visca of the Greutert firm, Visca was operated in
Farben's interest and was just "one of the many names" under which
Farben appeared (R. 216, 269-71, 1844-7, 1853-63, 1873-9, 1887-8).
Counsel for petitioner admits the mounting influence on the Greutert
firm, as time went on, of Hermann Schmitz and other "people affiliated with I.G. Farben" (R. 63-4, 88-9).
Both petitioner and the Greutert firm depended on Farben's
money. The Swiss Compensation Office reports that Farben's "great
balances", deposited with Greutert, maintained Greutert in business,
and that "large assets" of Farben, kept with Greutert, were transferred to the petitioner after petitioner was created. Indeed, a Greutert
account in which Farben assets were carried was "the precursor of the
idea of establishing" petitioner (R. 211, 215, 270, 295-6, 776-83,
1212-3, 1277-9).
The early intimacy between petitioner and Greutert-Sturzenegger
continued. The two were managed by the same persons, in both the
prewar and wartime periods. Until 1940, Hermann Schmitz of
Farben was chairman of the board of petitioner and, in the words of
the Swiss Compensation Office, he "held the reins" in petitioner's affairs (R. 89, 214).
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EXHIBIT C
Brief for Appellees McGrath and Clark, at I, Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, 188 F.2d 1017 (App. D.C. 1951).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
In the opinion of defendants-appellees, the questions presented
are as follows:
Where a Swiss corporation is maintaining a suit, under Section
9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, for return of property of
the corporation vested under the Act, may stockholders of the corporation, who own 86 of some 300,000 outstanding shares, intervene
in the suit to assert:
1. A derivative cause of action, on behalf of the corporation,
for the share of the vested assets proportionate to the corporation's
non-enemy-tainted stockholders, the recovery to be for the benefit of
such stockholders; and
2. A cause of action that the corporation and the defendant
Alien Property Custodian be enjoined from settling the case between
them unless the above-mentioned proportionate share be first paid or
secured.
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EXHIBIT D

Brief for the Secretary of Labor, at 4, Wirtz v. Local 66, Glass Blowers
Ass'n., No. 16944 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 1969) (remandedforfurther proceedings).
Statement in Brief
... Starting with the meeting of November, 1964, until September,
1964, his attendance record was perfect, with the exception of July,
1965, his vacation month.
Appendix to Brief for Appellant, at 138a-140a, Wirtz v. Local 66, Glass
Bottle Blowers Ass'n., 16944 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 1969) (remandedfor further
proceedings).
Portion of the Appendix
BY MR. SAVAGE [Attorney for Defendant]:
Q Miss Stoller [who was recording secretary of the union], you
testified that September '63 until December of '63 Mr. Razvoza was
not credited with attending any meetings, is that correct? September
to December of 1963?
A Yes.
Q And, from January of '64 until October of 1964, how many
meetings did Mr. Razvoza attend or was he given credit for attending?
A Two.
Q And, these two you are referring to, are those where he was
physically present or are those what you refer to as write-ins?
A Write-ins.
Q And, it was after October of '64 that he was appointed to his office of financial secretary, is that right?
A Right.
Q Now, from October of 1964 until December of '64, how many

meetings did Mr. Razvoza obtain credit for attending or physically
attended?

A No, according to the information I have here, I only have it in
'65 until September.
Q
A

No, I said October of '64 until December of '64?
Oh, I see.
THE COURT: It would be three, two, one or zero.
THE WITNESS: That would be October November and
December. It would be two, November and December meetings he
was present.
BY MR. SAVAGE:
Q And, fromTHE COURT: November and December he was present.
BY MR. SAVAGE:
Q Was he present at the October '64 meeting?
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No.
Did he have a write-in for that meeting?
No.
Q November, he was present?
A Right.
Q December, he was present?
A Yes.
Q All right. And, from January of '65 to September of '65, would
you please tell us how many meetings he was physically present at or
obtained write-ins for attending?
A Eight. That was January; he was there February; he was there
March; April he was there; May he was there; June he was there; July
he wasn't; August he was there and September he was there.
Q So, subsequent to his appointment as financial secretary, he attended, or was given credit for, regularly?
A Yes.
THE COURT: No write-in for July?
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. SAVAGE:
Q And, to your knowledge, that was his vacation month?
A Yes, to my knowledge that was his vacation.
Q In accordance with the prior procedures that you have testified
to, would absence from a regular monthly meeting because of vacation be reason to give an individual a write-in or credit attending
that meeting?
A Yes.

